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Behavioral economics improves economic analysis by using psychological regularity to 
suggest limits on rationality and self-interest (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003). Expressing 
these regularities in formal terms permits productive theorizing, suggests new experiments, can 
contribute to psychology, and can be used to shape economic policies which make normal people 
better off.  
The crucial leap in behavioral economics is taking the details of thinking seriously, rather 
than settling for the conventional apology that models are only “as if” representations of the 
output of a neural “black box”. Thinking seriously about cognitive detail, and formalizing those 
ideas, has become more fashionable in economics recently.  Models of intertemporal choice seek 
to understand precisely how people think about the future (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002). Theories of social preference formalize how people feel about allocations 
of payoffs to themselves and others (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Camerer, 2003, chapter 2). Another 
major innovation in economics is the observation that people think differently about gains and 
losses, which implies that the way outcomes are described or “framed” can affect which choices 
are made (Rabin, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
Strategic interactions among many players, or “games”, are of special interest for 
behavioral economics because even games which are very simple representations of naturally-
occurring situations can give rise to equilibria that strain computational ability. As a result,  
games are a domain in which models of limited thinking are quite likely to provide better 
predictions than equilibrium theories. Indeed, behavioral game theory researchers have 
developed precise models of how deeply people are thinking about games which are as general 
as equilibrium theories, typically more accurate (and often more precise as well; Nagel, 1995; 
Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 
2003a,b; Camerer, 2003, chapter 5).   
This chapter discusses how recording the information people seek in games can permit 
sharp inference about what goes on inside the black box (the brain) and can therefore inform 
theories about why people behave the way they do. Until recently, experimental economics was 
strongly influenced by the tradition of identifying unobserved (latent) utilities with choices, or 
revealed preferences. This tradition focuses attention on only one type of data from a decision-- 
the observed choice. Looking only at choices is scientifically efficient because many other 
aspects of cognition *can* be measured (as we show below); and these other measures can be 
used to distinguish between alternative theories which can account for observed choices equally 
well. Indeed, as economists have become more interested in evolutionary and behavioral 
approaches, the number of theoretical alternative accounts has increased. The “process data” 
described in this chapter help by providing a richer set of data which allows us to sort through 
alternative explanations more quickly.    
Measuring information search improves scientific efficiency in two ways: 
• Process data facilitates the evaluation of  multiple theories.  In early experiments 
in game theory, the fundamental question was whether players chose equilibrium 
strategies (and when alternative equilibrium concepts made different predictions, 
which were most accurate). From this relatively well proscribed set of 
alternatives, a game theorist must now consider many more possibilities, 
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including concerns about fairness and limited cognition.  Studying thinking 
allows us to explore this space of alternative explanations more efficiently by 
providing additional measures and constraints within the same experimental 
session. For example, in bargaining games fairness theories require that players 
look at the payoffs of others, even if those payoffs are strategically irrelevant. 
Theories of limited cognition can therefore be tested by looking at what 
information players do not examine. 
• Process data can help us understand heterogeneity among individuals.  While a 
single experiment might provide a dozen observed choices for an individual, 
augmenting that study with process data can greatly increase our ability to 
understand how individuals differ, when quite different processes lead to the 
same observed choices. As a result, we can identify which ‘type’ an individual is 
more quickly if we can watch the inputs to thinking. Understanding 
heterogeneity is important because it is well-established that how different types 
interact is important in determining system-wide behavior.2 
 
This chapter gives two concrete examples of the advantages of using process data to 
study cognition in games, and also mention the caveats of using process data. We start by 
offering a quick overview of process measures, then provide a quick review of several studies 
that have applied process data to games.  Finally, we close by discussing the future of process 
data in economics. 
Visiting the Thinking Factory. 
 There are many ways to study the psychological  processes underlying cognition. We 
lump different methods together under the term “process data”, meaning the flow of information 
used in service to cognition. All the methods share one characteristic:  They observe how people 
acquire information.  By observing the arrival and use of information, we can infer something 
about the nature of underlying cognition.  Note well that we are not talking about peoples’ self-
reports about their own thinking. While self-reports are sometimes insightful, there are well-
known problems with introspective access to cognition which limit what can be learned from just 
asking people what they were thinking (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).  
Johnson et al (2002) introduced the analogy of the human brain as a “thinking factory.” 
One can make educated guesses about a factory's production process by observing the flow of 
inputs into the factory, the length of processing time before new inputs enter the factory, and the 
factory’s final output without ever looking inside the factory. Lawyers studying jury decisions 
(whose deliberations cannot be directly observed) and intelligence agencies make inferences like 
this routinely. Similarly, the order in which subjects gather information, and how long they use 
information before getting more information, can be used to make educated guesses about how 
subjects are thinking (i.e., the production process in the neural “thinking factory”).  If 
information is not acquired, it cannot be used, just as a car factory which never receives 
shipments of rustproofing chemicals cannot possibly be rustproofing its cars.  
                                                 
2 The most familiar examples is models of repeated games, in which a small percentage of types with 
“unusual” behavior can profoundly affect what other players do.  
Comment: Colin:  I might prefer 
process data, what do you think? 
SWITCHED 
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An analogy can be made to revealed preference.  Choices between objects (such as 
commodity bundles or gambles) reveal unobservable preferences. Similarly, studies of industrial 
output reveal unobserved production functions. Asking subjects to `choose’ information is asking 
them to reveal their preference for information, which can provide clues to unobservable 
thinking patterns.   
Psychologists and consumer researchers have employed many process tracing techniques,  
including recording people ‘talking aloud’ while thinking  (Ericsson & Simon, 1980), watching 
the physical retrieval of information required to solve a problem (Payne, 1976 and Jacoby et al, 
1985), or asking people what information they would use (Wason, Johnson-Laird).     
 The basic idea behind all process tracing techniques is illustrated by recording eye 
fixations, because it underlies most visual information acquisition   It surprises most people to 
learn that our visual world is, in part, illusory. While we believe that we see a continuous stream 
of visual input, the eye is more like a still camera than a movie camera.  For almost all vision that 
requires significant acuity, the eye makes a series of jumps or saccades between pauses, called 
fixations.   During the 100 milliseconds or so required for a saccadic movement, vision is 
actually suppressed.   One tends not see a brief light that is flashed during an eye movement.  It 
is the brain that takes the sensory output of these discrete snapshots each lasting around .2 to 5 
seconds and creates the perception that we see a continuous, uninterrupted view.   The  beauty of 
eye fixation recording is that it is exactly what goes on in the real world:   All high level 
cognition, such as reading, uses eye fixations, and eye fixations have been quite useful in 
studying reading and similar tasks (Just & Carpenter, 1976). Eye fixations have also been used to 
study choice (Russo & Rosen, 1974). But recording eye fixations (typically by filming the 
direction of eye gaze relative to stimuli spaced sufficiently apart on a screen) is expensive and 
the method is somewhat uncomfortable.  It is also not easily adapted to group settings. 
Many researchers now employ computer-based information acquisition as an analog for 
recording eye fixations. These methods display information hidden in boxes on a computer 
screen and observe a person as they “acquire” or “look up” information using some kind of 
pointing device like a mouse. People navigate through a task by moving the mouse and clicking 
on boxes which reveal information they want to know. 
Tracking “clicks” is now a major activity for internet web sites, but computer-based 
information acquisition has a long history that predates the web.  It has been used extensively to 
study individual decision-making and consumer choice.   Studies of decision making include the 
choice of gambles (Payne & Braunstein, 1978), the setting of reservation prices for gambles 
using different response modes (Johnson and Schkade), the effects of time pressure on choice 
((Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Reiskamp and Hoffrage, 2000) and the study of preference 
reversals. (Schkade & Johnson, 1989).  Studies of consumer choice includeJacoby, Jaccard, 
Kuss, Troutman, & Mazursk (1985).   
Computerized methods offer  several advantages over verbal self-reports, eye 
movements, having subjects request information displayed on file cards, and other older 
methods.  Using a mouse reduces the impact of the measurement procedure upon the underlying 
process.  Computer-based methods also easily adapted to group situations, unlike verbal 
protocols and eye movements.  The recording of information acquisition is automatic, so 
experiments can be run on networked computers without obtrusive intervention by 
experimenters.  An important question is whether recording process data in these ways changes 
the process (a la the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics—does the act of experimental 
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observation change the process being observed?). The answer is generally “No” but we defer 
further discussion to the end of this chapter.  
Thinking Backwards 
 
Consider an alternating offer sequential bargaining game  (Stahl, 1972; Rubinstein, 
1982). This study (Camerer et al, 1993; Johnson, et al 2002) illustrates the use of process data to 
(1) distinguish among alternative theories and (2) to examine individual differences. 
 In this game, two players, 1 and 2, bargain over a pie that shrinks in value in each of 
three periods (reflecting discounting due to impatience).  The pie is worth about $5 in the first 
period, $2.50 in the second period, $1.25 in the third period, and nothing after that.  Starting with 
player 1, the players alternate making offers, which the responding player can accept or reject. If 
an offer is rejected, the pie shrinks and the player who rejected it then makes a counteroffer.  
Play is not well predicted by equilibrium:  If players are purely self-interested (and 
believe others are too3), perfect equilibrium divisions can be derived by backward induction, 
starting with the third-period division and working backward.  The perfect equilibrium is 
(approximately4) for player 1 to offer $1.25 and keep the rest for himself.   In experiments, 
subjects typically offered something between the $1.25 equilibrium and $2.50 (which is an equal 
split of the first-round pie).  Offers average around $2.00.  Lower offers, including offers near 
the equilibrium prediction of $1.25, are frequently rejected. 
  At least two theories offer possible explanations.  The first, limited computation (LC), 
explain observed departures from perfect equilibrium by suggesting that players do not reason 
game-theoretically, and hence do not initially understand how the structure of the game conveys 
bargaining power. The second class of theories uses equilibrium social preferences to account for 
departures from perfect equilibrium.  They  posit a “social utility” for others' payoffs or 
differences in payoffs (Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989); Fehr and Schmidt (1999);  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Charness and Rabin (2002); Camerer (2003), chapter 2), a 
preference for reciprocating fairness and unfairness (Rabin (1993)), or an unobserved component 
of payoffs which appears like noise or a mistake to an outside observer (McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1995, 1998); Goeree and Holt (2001); Weizsacker (in press)).   
Of course, these two theories are not mutually exclusive, and people may well differ in 
the degree they believe in fairness or have limited computational abilities.  Clean predictions 
 
3 Of course, the perfect equilibrium prediction in an n-stage game requires n levels of iterated belief in self-
interest. For example, in our game player 1 offers $1.25 only if she is self-interested, believes 2 is (which guarantees 
a minimal ultimatum offer in the third round), and believes 2 believes she (1) is (which guarantees a $1.25 offer to 1 
in round 2, leading player 1 to offer $1.26 in round 1),  
4 In the third round, player 1 offers $.01 or nothing (depending on whether player 2 will accept nothing) 
and earns $1.24-$1.25.  In the second round, player 2 must offer $1.24-$1.26 to player 1, leaving $1.24-$1.26 to 
herself.  In the first round, player 1 must therefore offer $1.24-$1.27 to player 2.  For simplicity, we refer to this 
range of perfect equilibria as “the” equilibrium at $1.25, recognizing that the equilibrium is not unique, and is 
subgame perfect rather than only Nash (every offer is consistent with Nash).  Note that a short cut to calculating 
equilibria in games of this form is that the first player earns the sum of the pie sizes in odd-numbered rounds ($5.00 
+ $1.25), minus the pies values in even-numbered rounds (- $2.50).    Alternatively, the first player should offer the 
third pie minus the second pie to the second player, which does not even require her to know the first-period pie 
size. 
based on choices alone are ambiguous.  Table 1 shows four theories which combine elements of 
fairness and limited computation.  We describe each combination briefly.  
If players care only about their own payoffs, and can compute perfect equilibrium, then 
GT predicts is that players will offer $1.25.  Now suppose players can compute perfect 
equilibrium, but they either care about fairness or believe others do. This combination of “game 
theoretic with fairness" (GT-F). suggests that offers will lie in an interval between the GT 
prediction and the equal-split point, [$1.25,$2.50].  If players may do not reason game-
theoretically and not initially understand how the structure of the game creates bargaining power.  
Such a "limited computation" (LC) theory, predicted offers could lie anywhere; if we assume an 
upper bound at the equal split point $2.50, we predict an offer p in the range [0,2.50].  If players 
have limited computation and are concerned with fairness, we predict offers will be more 
generous than in the LC case, p1>p.   Note that under these conditions, only the GT prediction 
seems inconsistent with the existing data, and our results. 
Table 1:  Model Predictions 
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Figure 1:  Computer Display, Alternating Offer Game 
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Software records the entrance and exit time for each box, typically to the 1/60th of a 
second.   Typically these data are characterized by a dense series of acquisitions with durations 
much like those generated by eye fixation recording, ranging in length from 200 milliseconds to 
a few seconds in length.  Consistent with the notion that this is a relatively effortless and costless 
response, there are many occasions when subjects open the same box more than once, showing 
that it is easier to move the mouse than memorize something.5    shows the data, both in 
terms of number of acquisitions and in terms of the distribution of total time.   Fi  also 
Figure 2
gure 2
5 There are exceptions.  We had the opportunity to demonstrate this design to a well known game theorist, 
who used the mouse (with two hands) and wrote the numbers down on a piece of paper.   Fortunately for us, such 
behavior is exceedingly rare:   To date it has been confined to Nobel Prize winners. 
demonstrates that using process tracing data represents a challenge in data presentation:  How 
can we show mean looking times and numbers of look-ups, as well as transitions from cell to 
cell?  The “icon graph” at the left of Figur  is one method to show all these data: For each box 
(i.e., each amount to be divided in each round), the width of the bars is proportional to the 
number of acquisitions, the height is proportional to the total looking time, and the black arrows 
to the left of the figure show the frequency of transitions (bolder = more frequent, with fewer 
than one transition on average omitted).6 
e 2
Figure 2:  Distribution of Acquisitions, and Transitions by Round. 
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Like most studies, we found a fairly broad range of offers in the first round from around 
the equilibrium of $1.25 to some just above the midpoint of $2.50.  Based upon choice data 
alone, we were unable to distinguish between theories.   The process tracing data, shown in 
 seems more compatible with a limited cognition view:  Many subjects do not look at the 
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6 The skewness of these data is typical.   For analysis, it is often useful to either use nonparametric 
methods, which often lack statistical power, or to  analyse the data with parametric techniques after a log transform  
x’ – log(x+c) where c is a small constant, typically .5, used to prevent taking the log of 0.  Means are reported after 
an inverse transformation. 
subsequent rounds:  19%  do not open the second box, and 10% do not open the third.   Both 
pieces of information would be necessary to calculate the equilibrium. 
 Yet there seems to be great heterogeneity in offers and search.  Without process data, the 
range of offers might be duly noted and remain unexplained.   To help us understand this 
heterogeneity, however we posited three types of information acquisition, roughly corresponding 
to levels of look ahead:  Level 0 considered only the current payoff in Round 1, Level 1 looked 
at this round payoff and that in the next round, while Equilibrium players must consider all three 
rounds. 
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Figure 3:  Search and Offers by Type 
Figure 3
 
Types are classified by identifying which box was looked at longest in the first 
bargaining round.  This is simple, and allows us to test if the offers are indeed related to search.  
 displays the results for the process tracing data and offers, aggregating across our first 
two studies.  The top of the figure displays an icon graph that is very much as predicted:  Those 
 
trials which are characterized as exhibiting “Level 0 look ahead” spend most of their time with 
the first round payoff, spend very little time looking at other payoffs, and make very few 
comparisons between subsequent payoffs. Their mean offers are $2.07.  Level 1 cognition is 
characterized by increased time spent on the second round payoff, and have mean offers of 
$1.71.  Finally, those trials which are characterized by the most acquisitions of the last round 
payoff, look much like we expect from backward induction:  Minimal examination of the first 
round payoff, concentration on the second and third round payoff with many comparisons, and a 
mean offer of $1.44.  While there is substantial dispersion in the offers produced within each 
information-lookup type category, the differences in the offer distributions across the three 
columns show that it is possible to statistically predict what a player will offer from what 
information they look at most often. The big loser among the alternative theories is the idea that 
players make nonequilibrium offers because they do equilibrium computations but adjust for 
fairness concerns of others (“GT-fairness”), since the most fair offers come from subjects who 
simply do not look ahead. Furthermore, in one experimental condition subjects bargain against a 
computerized opponent who is programmed to maximize its own payoff (and to expect that other 
subjects will too). In that condition, must subjects do not offer $1.25, which they would if they 
were computing money-maximizing offers optimally; although they learn to do so quite rapidly 
with a little instruction in backward induction.  
This study shows that process data allows us to both (1) increase the set of strategies 
considered (to include steps of thinking) and (2) provide a better account of heterogeneity in 
these data. 
 
Thinking Forwards 
 
 
Figure 4:  Forward Induction Game 
Figure 4
Market Game Outside Option 
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 shows a game we used to study forward induction.  Player 1 can choose the 
outside option and guarantee a payoff of 11, or play a simultaneous-move "battle of the sexes" 
subgame, choosing up or down.  What would you do?   
11 
(1)
10 
(2)
7 
(8)
13 
(3)
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8 
(4)
7 
(5)
    L               R               L                R 
Up 12 
 (6)
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3 Down 
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A rational Player A plays the market subgame and then plays Down,7 expecting player 2 
to reason as follows:  
Player 1 could have had a payoff of 11.  Instead, she entered the game, 
signaling that she intends to get more than 11.  The only equilibrium 
which yields more is (Down, Left).  Since I have deduced that she will 
move Down I should move Left.  
This clever argument is called "forward induction" (Kohlberg & Mertens, 1986; van 
Damme, 1989):  choices at current nodes have implications for play in future nodes.  To do 
forward induction, player 2 must look player 1’s choices, ones which will not be played and 
which are not choices for player 2. Player 2 must reason that those payoffs may offer clues about 
what player 1 intends to do.  
We ran three sessions of games similar to that in , with 14 subjects each.  (The 
games differed in Player A’s option payoff, either 14 or 11, and Player B’s option payoff, either 
6, 10, or 16.) Contrary to forward induction, player 1 subjects chose the outside option more than 
half the time (55%) of the time.  (In a structurally similar game, Schotter et al, 1994, observed 
70% choice of the outside option; Camerer, 2003, chapters 5 and 7, summarizes other studies 
showing weak support for forward induction). When Player A’s did choose to play the matrix 
game, they chose the bottom row 95% of the time; so the Player A’s who anticipated that Player 
B’s would do forward induction were betting heavily by choosing the bottom row almost all the 
time. In addition, B’s played left about 75% of the time. Furthermore, there was little change 
across twelve repetitions, indicating no detectable learning. 
Figure 4
Process data provide a partial answer to why the forward induction was rare.   
presents an icon graph of Player B’s looking time.   Note that there are very few lookups of  
acquisition of either outside option payoff— the box S11 icon is skinny and the associated 
looking time is low (little shaded area)-- although player B has to look at player A’s option 
payoff (box S11) to make a forward induction inference. But note that Player B’s do not think 
that Player A’s playoff are irrelevant; in fact, they spend considerable time looking at Player A’s 
payoffs in the matrix subgame. It is just the outside option payoffs of both players that are 
neglected by Player B’s.  This is particularly interesting because both players alternated roles.   It 
is also interesting because Player A’s are affected by the outside option. 
Figure 5
Comparing behavior when payoffs change also helps clarify what players are doing. 
Recall that Player A’s option payoff is either 11 or 14, in different treatments. In both cases the 
option payoff is above the “bad” pure equilibrum payoff for Player A (which is 7) and also above 
the expected mixed-strategy equilibrium payoff (which is 10). Forward induction point to the 
“market, (bottom,left)” equilibrium in both cases. But when the option payoff is 14, the “market, 
(bottom, left)” equilibrium can also be reached by three steps of deletion of dominated strategies: 
If B’s think that A’s will never violate dominance, they think the A’s will never play “market, 
top”; eliminating that dominated strategy, B’s will always choose “left”; if A’s believe B’s will 
play that strategy, A’s will play “market, bottom”. Thus, if A’s think that B’s think that A’s will  
 
7. More formally: The subgame has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (T,r) and (B,l), and a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium (.5T+.5B,.5r+.5l) (with expected utilities (10,7.5)).  The entire game has Nash equilibria in which player 1 
moves L because she thinks subgame play will give her less than 14.  Of those, the equilibria (LT,r) and 
(L(.5T+.5b),.5r+.5l) are subgame perfect too.  The perfect, Nash equilibrium (RB,l) is the unique "stable" equilibrium 
which satisfies forward induction.   
  
Figure 5:  Icon Graph, Player B 
 
 
 
obey dominance, A’s should play “market, bottom”. If B’s think A’s will obey dominance the 
B’s will play “left”.  
Thus, when A’s option payoff is 14, applying dominance iteratively leads to the “market, 
(bottom, left)” outcome even without forward induction reasoning. One might therefore expect 
that the forward induction outcome is more frequent when A’s outside option payoff is higher, 
14 rather than 11 (since both forward induction and iterated reasoning predict that outcome when 
A’s option payoff is 14). Intuitively, in rational analyses the higher option payoff for A gives the 
B players more reason to believe that A will play the market game, and more reason—if they are 
iteratedly rational—to infer that they should play “left”, which in turn draws strategically-
minded A’s into the market game. In fact, the opposite is true: When the option payoff was 14, 
Players A entered the market game only 38% of the time; when the option payoff was 11 they 
entered the market game 57% of the time. So changing A’s option payoff had the opposite effect 
of what a rational analysis would predict.  
The fact that more Player A’s chose the option when its payoff was higher (14 rather than 
11) is consistent with a model in which players are limited in their strategic thinking, but are not 
 12
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sure other are rational (e.g., Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003b). Crawford (2003) put a similar 
analysis to work in a careful study of deception.  
 About ten years ago, we created some behavioral game theory around this concept—
especially the idea that players treated choices of other players as gambles, rather than as the 
result of a delicate (iterated) reasoning process. At that time, we did not know precisely how to 
model this idea, and rationality-based game theory was so roaringly productive that buyers for a 
cognitively-plausible alternative were scarce. It is heartening that theorists eventually accepted 
the mathematical challenge of modelling the limits on rationality that we envisioned, and are 
now relatively hungry for data to guide their theorizing.    
Thinking Normally 
 
The studies above explore whether players look backward and forward in “extensive-
form” games that take place in several stages.. Inspired by our earlier studies, Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford and Broseta (2001,2002) used Mouselab to answer a more basic question in game 
theory: How strategically do players think in “normal form” (matrix) games? 
 Their ambitious study used 18 different games, with from 2 to 4 strategies for each 
player. The games were carefully designed so that players using different decision rules would 
pick different strategies, and different rules imply different patterns of information acquisition. 
Assuming each player has a single strategy or “type”, they then use a sophisticated Bayesian 
procedure (cf. Harless and Camerer, 1994; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995;) to infer which type a 
player is most likely to be, given the player’s choices and information acquisition across the 18 
games.  
Some of the decision rules they consider do not use sophisticated strategic thinking about 
what others will do. These rules are:  “naïve” or level 1 (L1) (choose strategies with the highest 
average payoff, averaging all payoffs equally; “optimistic” or maximax (choose the strategy with 
the highest possible payoff); “pessimistic” or maximin (choose the strategy with the highest 
possible minimal payoff); and “altruistic” (maximize the sum of the two players' payoffs).  
 There are also five strategic types: “L2” (best-respond to L1); “D1” which does one 
round of deleting dominated decisions, then best-responds to a uniform prior on the remaining 
decisions; “D2”, which does two rounds of deletion then best-responds to remaining strategies; 
“sophisticated” who guess accurately the proportion of the population that chooses each 
nonequilbrium strategy8; and “Nash” (equilibrium).  
 As in our work, subjects participated in baseline and “open boxes” conditions, to see 
whether hiding payoffs behind boxes limited strategic thinking (it did, but only a little). They 
also trained subjects to use the various decision rules (and rewarded them for picking the 
strategies those decision rules should pick) to calibrate what information acquisition looks like 
for various decision rules.  
 The percentages of untrained subjects choosing equilibria were 90%, 65%, and 15% 
when equilibria require 1, 2, and 3 levels of iterated dominance, respectively, which is consistent 
with much other evidence that people do only one or two steps of strategic reasoning (e.g., 
 
8 Importantly, in the first version of their paper the L2, D1 and D2 types were not included in the analysis, 
and their procedure classified nearly half of the subjects as “sophisticated”. When these types are included the 
fraction of estimated “sophisticates” falls almost to zero, which shows that specifying a rich space of decision rules 
is important to draw the right conclusions.  
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Nagel, 1999; Camerer, 2003, chapter 5; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003).  However, trained 
subjects find equilibria almost perfectly (90-100% of the time). Like our finding that human 
subjects exposed to backward induction quickly make equilibrium offers to robot subjects, the 
powerful effects of training show that strategic thinking is not “computationally difficult” per se; 
it just requires decision rules which are not unintuitive, but easily taught. Strategic thinking is not 
like weight lifting or dunking a basketball, where performance is constrained by physical limits. 
Instead, strategic thinking is more like learning to windsurf or ski, which require people to learn 
skills which are unnatural and overcome natural instincts (overcoming the reluctance to lean 
forward going downhill and backward toward the water). Learning backward induction requires 
overcoming the intuition that future subgames which are unlikely to be played can be ignored; 
and learning iterated reasoning requires looking as much at another player’s payoffs as one’s 
own.  
 Since different decision rules point to different strategies in each game, by looking at a 
player's strategy choices the player can be classified according to which decision rule they use 
most often (cf. Harless and Camerer 1994, 1995; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995). 
 Table 2 shows the fraction of subjects estimated to be using each of the decision rules, 
when the estimation is doing using either the decisions alone, *or* the decisions plus information 
search data. The table makes three important points:  
First, about 90% of the subjects appear to use simple rules (L1, L2) which are only 
minimally strategic (i.e., a player A does not assume that B is reasoning about A). Hardly any 
consistently choose equilibrium. 
Second, if CGCB had done their study using only decision data, without process data, 
they would have drawn the wrong conclusion. Here’s why: When only decisions are used to 
classify players, about 20% of players are assumed to use each of the decision rules L1 and D1. 
But when information search is used as well, the 19% originally classified as D1 shrinks to zero,  
  
Table 2: Estimated frequencies of various decision rules and their expected payoffs (Costa-
Gomes et al, 2001)  
  
 Information used to estimate frequencies expected
Decision rule Decisions  Decisions and search payoff 
Altruistic .089 .022 17.11 
Pessimistic .000 .045 20.93 
Naïve (L1) .227 .448 21.38 
Optimistic .000 .022 21.38 
L2 .442 .441 24.87 
D1 .195 .000 24.13 
D2 .000 .000 23.95 
Equilibrium .052 .000 24.19 
Sophisticated .000 .022 24.93 
 
 
and the percentage classified as L1 roughly doubles. The reason for this is that the D1 and L1 
types often make the same decisions, but the D1 types must look at other players’ payoffs (to see 
whether other players have dominated strategies that can logically be eliminated), which L1 
 15
types do not. Most of these players look at others’ payoffs rarely, so the process data show it is 
statistically much more likely that they are L1’s than D1’s (despite the fact that the predicted 
choices of those types often coincide). The process data therefore overturns an incorrect 
conclusion drawn from the decision-only data.  
Third, there appears to be a sensible cost-benefit tradeoff between complexity of rules 
and their payoffs which explains why most subjects use simple rules (cf. Johnson and Payne, 
1985). The second column of Table 2 shows the expected dollar payoff to subjects using each 
type of rule (if they were randomly matched with every other subject, given how subjects 
actually behaved). The L1 and optimistic rules make a little more than $21 and don’t require 
looking at the other player’s payoffs at all. The L2 and D* rules earn about 10% more, about 
$24, and L2 actually earns more than equilibrium! This might seem anomalous since it is easy to 
confuse “equilibrium” and “optimal”. But equilibrium strategies are only universally optimal—
i.e., better than any other strategy—if they are dominant strategies. But generally, an equilibrium 
strategy can be a bad response to disequilibrium moves by others, and simpler rules like L2 
appear to be more robust. Note also that since the sophisticated types' best respond to the actual 
mixture of decision rules being used, by definition they have the highest expected earnings. 
However,  they earn only $.06 less than the L2’s, which means that being fully sophisticated is 
only slightly more profitable than doing two steps of strategic thinking.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we presented three examples of how process data can be used to 
understand how people play sequential and matrix games. In all three studies, motivated, 
intelligent subjects behave sensibly, but do not exhibit the extent of strategic reasoning which is 
commonly assumed when game theory is applied to understand auctions, industrial pricing, 
political maneuvering, incentive design, and so forth.  
In the sequential bargaining studies, subjects rarely look ahead to future nodes which they 
believe (correctly) are unlikely to be reached. In the forward induction game, most second-mover 
players do not look back at the first-mover’s possible payoffs (even though she might use the 
foregone payoff to infer something about what the first-mover will hope to get in the future, and 
hence what she might do). In the matrix games, most players appear to do one or two steps of 
strategic thinking.  
 
 
Caveats 
 
It is sensible to wonder whether the experimental procedure measuring process, by 
requiring a player to move a mouse to open boxes on a screen display, biases the results in some 
way. These concerns have been raised many times and addressed by further experiments: 
Does process tracing change the underlying process, is it reactive?  Within decision 
research, there is a significant literature replicating many standard phenomena established with 
pencil-and-paper methods, such as preference reversals, using computer based techniques (Payne 
et al., 1993), so the method of measurement does not change the observed result in these cases. 
Researchers have also directly compared behavior in games when players do not have to open 
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boxes, because they appear on the screen uncovered, with Mouselab trials where a mouse is used 
to open boxes.  Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) presented one session of their normal form games 
without covering up the payoffs and noted no difference in observed choices.   In our work on 
sequential bargaining, we also ran a control session with open boxes, and the offers were within 
$.01 of offers when boxes were closed and a mouse was used.  Lohse and Johnson (1996) have 
compared eye fixation recording with one particular computer-based system, MOUSELAB and 
found only small differences (typically when the display was large, probably due to limited 
peripheral vision).    
Can process tracing data really tell us about underlying decision processes?   Will it 
know a game theorist when it meets one? Costa-Gomes et al. (2002)  and Johnson  et al (2002) 
ran controls where subjects were trained to follow game theoretic principles, to see what 
information acquisition by “game theorists” would look like. In our work, we ran several groups 
who had been trained to calculate the backward induction equilibrium.   Their process was quite 
different from untrained subjects bargaining with each other (or with computerized opponents)—
viz., the trained subjects opened the 3rd and 2nd round payoff boxes much more often, and made 
many more backward transitions 3rd round payoff box to earlier-round boxes. A similar control 
has been run for normal-form games by Costa-Gomes et al. with similar results.   In the decision 
literature, Bettman et al. (1990) reports success training subjects to follow various choice 
strategies. 
How important is the position of payoffs in the display?  In most western languages, 
people read from left to right and top to bottom. One might well be concerned that this left-right, 
top-down bias is reflected in which boxes are opened first. To measure this bias, we ran a group 
of subjects where the order of the payoffs were reversed from top to bottom (i.e., the 3rd round 
payoff was at the top and the 1st round at the bottom). The results looked like an inverted version 
of Figure 2, and replicated the results we discuss below.   
Together, these results indicate that forcing players to open boxes to gather information  
does not produce important changes in cognition or eventual choices. 
 
Avoiding Pitfalls 
 
There are two potential pitfalls in collecting and analyzing process data. One is that it is 
crucial to minimize memorization so that we can rely on subjects constantly reacquiring 
information as they need it (rather than remembering). This design desideratum favors complex 
displays and subjects who are facile in using mice or other technologies. he fact that subjects 
typically open the same box more than once in a trial-- often many times— suggests it just as 
easy for them to move a mouse as it is to remember.  
The second pitfall is that observations of decisions trickle out, like a dripping faucet, 
while process data are like a firehose of information. Since there are so many data (and multiple 
measures), it is difficult to see what is going on without having a strong theory that tells you 
exactly what patterns to look for.  A strong theory also tells you how to design the experiment. 
For example, Costa-Gomes et al carefully chose games in which different decision rules led to 
different choices and to different patterns of information acquisition.  
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The Future 
Studying thinking is hard work. By definition, thinking is an internal event and is 
relatively unobservable.   There may be great promise in the new technologies in neuroscience 
such as fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), but currently there are significant 
challenges in these endeavors:  Gathering data is costly, the interpretation requires significant 
knowledge of  the brain and its structures, and the data has mediocre limited time resolution. In 
fact, progress in neuroscience has been rapid largely because results are only accepted when 
different methods (animal studies, lesion patients, physiological measures, fMRI) corroborate 
one another (see Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003).       
To economic theorists, optimization tools are a familiar hammer which makes everything 
look like a nail. As a result, economists will find it irresistible to build models in which the 
choice of decision rules and information can be “reverse engineered” as optimal solutions to 
decision making under constraint (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson, 200). Optimizing theories have 
proved very useful, and “optimally suboptimal” theories of bounded rationality can be useful too, 
provided they stick close to the details of what is known about cognitive mechanisms, or make 
sharp empirical implications. It is easy for such exercises to degenerate into “just so” stories 
which posit a very special set of premises under which a behavior is proved to be optimal. 
However, it is usually difficult to prove that the posited set of premises are the only ones under 
which the behavior is optimal (i.e., it is easier to prove that the premises are sufficient than that 
they are necessary). As a result, it is legitimate to judge whether the premises are reasonable 
using other sources of data. To be taken seriously, such theories should therefore take empirical 
constraint seriously on either the front end of the modeling exercise (grounding the basic features 
of the model firmly in empirical regularity) or on the back end (requiring a sharp implication 
which would falsify the model and is worth testing), or both.  
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